Definiçâo I
“A quantidade de matéria é a medida da mesma, oriunda conjuntamente da sua densidade e grandeza.”
Definiçâo II
“A quantidade do movimento é a medida do mesmo, provinda conjuntamente da velocidade e da quantidade da matéria.”
Definiçâo III
“A força inata (ínsita) da matéria é um poder de resistir pelo qual cada corpo, enquanto depende dele, persevera em seu estado, seja de descanso, seja de movimento uniforme em linha reta.”
Isaac Newton
“We not only lack a model for how we inhabit our bodies and brains as first-person consciousness, but we are as far from one, in a real sense, as Parmenides and Anaxagoras were in pre-Socratic Greek times. Pretty amazing plight, given the ground covered since. We have advanced on everything else in skinny about the universe but no on how its interior light turned on, how the gap was crossed from matter to maine, or how the city got inside the acorn. The brain remains a complex but ordinary object in Newtonian/Darwinian space-time while the mind is a baffling phenomenal (or epiphenomenal) effect associated with but not supervening it.
(…)
The widely accepted premise within neuroscience is that “awareness and subjectivity are probably network effects, involving many millions of neurone in thalamic and cortical structures -neurons- not quantum collapses, not holographic waves, not transductions of uncertainty states into thoughts.
(…)
A scientific waiver to pursue a quantum brain goes something like this: if your proper view is that consciousness is neurons, neurons, and more neurons (or molecules, molecules and more molecules) and that the sources has to be in there somewhere (because it can’t be anywhere else without invoking idealism, vitalism, Platonism, or some other extravagance), and if you are likewise convinced that consciousness cannot be understood using all the resources of molecular-level theories and the levels of explanations that they support -if you concluded that the phenomenon has completely stumped the entire scientific community- then (and only then) may you poke and prod for answers at a quantum level, as that is the sole resources left in the natural sciences.
(…)
Until the search for eroding got into microscopic properties of matter, reality was indeed very real. However, once it got small enough, it also became unreal or at least something other than real. But then I wonder what physicists expected to find under matter: a gateway into another universe, a microcosmic generator of materiality, a primal creationary field, nothing at all? Either stuff comes apart into something else or it spills all the beans, and we know it doesn’t spill the beans because, then, what might they be?
(…)
My own inclination at this point would be to give up on quantum-mechanical relationships in neural tissue and go for the greater backdrop: a conscious universe is a quantum universe. (…) In this game we don’t need discrete quantum special effects because the universe itself is a quantum effect. (…) Chaos there is, in fact, where consciousness as an emergent property meets consciousness as a quantum effect. (…) In an arena this vast with a specificity so entangle and nonlocal, “random” and “nonrandom” have no meaning. (…) Once again, the deepest entropy is also the ontological basis of the most intelligent information, as the Algorithm converges with the Archetype.”
Dark Pool of Light. Part 1
Richard Grossinger
“Surprisingly, given the pervasive popularity of this metaphor, there remains today no well-established evidence of symbolic manipulation or formal logical rules at the neurobiological level in animal physiology. . . . while the computational metaphor often seems to have the status of an established fact, it should be regarded as an hypothetical, and historical, conjecture about the brain. . . . Today’s embrace of the computational metaphor in the cognitive and neural sciences is so widespread and automatic that it begins to appear less like an innovative leap than like a bandwagon phenomenon, of the sort often observed in the sociology and history of science.”
J. G. Daugman
Todo pasa y todo queda,
pero lo nuestro es pasar,
pasar haciendo caminos,
caminos sobre el mar.
Nunca perseguí la gloria,
ni dejar en la memoria
de los hombres mi canción;
yo amo los mundos sutiles,
ingrávidos y gentiles,
como pompas de jabón.
Me gusta verlos pintarse
de sol y grana, volar
bajo el cielo azul, temblar
súbitamente y quebrarse…
Nunca perseguí la gloria.
Caminante, son tus huellas
el camino y nada más;
caminante, no hay camino,
se hace camino al andar.
Al andar se hace camino
y al volver la vista atrás
se ve la senda que nunca
se ha de volver a pisar.
Caminante no hay camino
sino estelas en la mar…
Hace algún tiempo en ese lugar
donde hoy los bosques se visten de espinos
se oyó la voz de un poeta gritar
“Caminante no hay camino,
se hace camino al andar…”
Golpe a golpe, verso a verso…
Murió el poeta lejos del hogar.
Le cubre el polvo de un país vecino.
Al alejarse le vieron llorar.
“Caminante no hay camino,
se hace camino al andar…”
Golpe a golpe, verso a verso…
Cuando el jilguero no puede cantar.
Cuando el poeta es un peregrino,
cuando de nada nos sirve rezar.
“Caminante no hay camino,
se hace camino al andar…”
Golpe a golpe, verso a verso.
Antonio Machado
“I do my thing and you do your thing.
I am not in this world to live up to your expectations,
and you are not in this world to live up to mine.
You are you, and I am I,
and if by chance we find each other, it’s beautiful.
If not, it can’t be helped.”
Fritz Perls
LEI I
Todo corpo permanece em seu estado de repouso ou de movimento uniforme em linha reta, a menos que seja obrigado a mudar seu estado por forças impressas nele.
LEI II
A mudança do movimento é proporcional à força motriz impressa, e se faz segundo a linha reta pela qual se imprime essa força.
LEI III
A uma açâo sempre se opôe uma reaçâo igual, ou seja, as açôes de dois corpos um sobre o outro sempre sâo iguais e se dirigem a partes contrárias.
Isaac Newton
“Elsewhere we have investigated in detail the movement of animals after their various kinds, the differences between them, and the reasons for their particular characters (for some animals fly, some swim, some walk, others move in various other ways); there remains an investigation of the common ground of any sort of animal movement whatsoever.
Now we have already determined (when we were discussing whether eternal motion exists or not, and its definition, if it does exist) that the origin of all other motions is that which moves itself, and that the origin of this is the immovable, and that the prime mover must of necessity be immovable.
Now in the animal world there must be not only an immovable without, but also within those things which move in place, and initiate their own movement. For one part of an animal must be moved, and another be at rest, and against this the part which is moved will support itself and be moved; for example, if it move one of its parts; for one part, as it were, supports itself against another part at rest.
For all things without life are moved by something other, and the origin of all things so moved are things which move themselves.
And out of these we have spoken about animals (for they must all have in themselves that which is at rest, and without them that against which they are supported); but whether there is some higher and prime mover is not clear, and an origin of that kind involves a different discussion. Animals at any rate which move themselves are all moved supporting themselves on what is outside them (…).
And since all inorganic things are moved by some other thing – and the manner of the movement of the first and eternally moved, and how the first mover moves it, has been determined before in our Metaphysics, it remains to inquire how the soul moves the body, and what is the origin of movement in a living creature. For, if we except the movement of the universe, things with life are the causes of the movement of all else, that is of all that are not moved by one another by mutual impact. And so all their motions have a term or limit, inasmuch as the movements of things with life have such. For all living things both move and are moved with some object, so that this is the term of all their movement, the end, that is, in view. Now we see that the living creature is moved by intellect, imagination, purpose, wish, and appetite. And all these are reducible to mind and desire.
The prime mover then moves, itself being unmoved, whereas desire and its faculty are moved and so move. But it is not necessary for the last in the chain of things moved to move something else; wherefore it is plainly reasonable that motion in place should be the last of what happens in the region of things happening, since the living creature is moved and goes forward by reason of desire or purpose, when some alteration has been set going on the occasion of sensation or imagination.
But how is it that thought (viz. sense, imagination, and thought proper) is sometimes followed by action, sometimes not; sometimes by movement, sometimes not? What happens seems parallel to the case of thinking and inferring about the immovable objects of science. There the end is the truth seen (for, when one conceives the two premisses, one at once conceives and comprehends the conclusion), but here the two premisses result in a conclusion which is an action.
What I need I ought to make, I need a coat: I make a coat. And the conclusion I must make a coat is an action.”
Aristotle
Alex Gomez-Marin 